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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to §78-2a-3 (2) (c), Utah Code Annotated. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order 
of the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, entered by the 
Honorable L. H. Griffiths, dated December 15, 1988. 
The Court granted Judgment against the Plaintiff 
pursuant to the Defendant's Counterclaim in the sum of $3,264.00. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial Court err in apparently determining 
that the payments made were from the separate funds of 
William Gregg and did not come from Karen who was fully 
obligated to pay on the note to Utah State Credit Union. 
II. Did the trial Court err by failing to categorize the 
payments to Utah State Credit Union as voluntary payments 
under 11 USC §524 (f). 
III. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial Court correctly 
determined the payments made to Utah State Credit Union 
were from the separate funds of William Gregg and that 
these payments were not voluntary payments within the 
meaning of §524 (f), did the trial Court use the wrong 
measure for computing damages. 
IV. Did the trial Court err by failing to make written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support its 
decision. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
11 USC §524 (a) A discharge in a case under this title--
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the 
extent that such judgment is a determination of the 
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt 
discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of 
this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is 
waived; 
(2) operates an an injunction against the commencement 
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or 
an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge 
of such debt is waived; and 
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement 
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or 
an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, 
property of the debtor of the kind specified in section 
541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the 
commencement of the case, on account of any allowable 
community claim, except a community claim that is excepted 
from discharge under section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) 
of this title, or that would be so excepted, determined in 
accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 
523(d) of this title, in a case concerning the debtor's 
spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the petition 
in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge 
of the debt based on such community claim is waived. 
11 USC §524 (c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the 
debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is 
based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this 
title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of 
such debt is waived, only if--
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the 
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this 
title; 
(2) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous 
statement which advises the debtor that the agreement may 
be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within sixty 
days after such agreement is filed with the court, 
whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to 
the holder of such claim; 
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(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and 
if applicable, accompanied by a declaration of an 
affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor 
during the course of negotiating an agreement under this 
subsection, which states that such agreement--
(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary 
agreement by the debtor; and 
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor. 
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any 
time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such 
agreement is filed with the court, which occurs later, by 
giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; 
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section 
have been complied with; and 
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not 
represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating 
an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such 
agreement as--
(i) not imposing an under hardship on the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor; and 
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor. 
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent 
that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real 
property. 
11 USC §524 (d) In a case concerning an individual, when the 
court has determined whether to grant or not to grant a 
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this 
title, the court may hold a hearing at which the debtor shall 
appear in person. At any such hearing, the court shall 
inform the debtor that a discharge has been granted or the 
reason why a discharge has not been granted. If a discharge 
has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an 
agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this 
section, then the court shall hold a hearing at which the 
debtor shall appear in person and at such hearing the court 
shall--
(1) inform the debtor--
(A) that such an agreement is not required under 
this title; under nonbankruptcy law, or under any 
agreement not made in accordance with the provisions 
of subsection (c) of this section; and 
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(B) of the legal effect and consequences of--
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in 
subsection (c) of this section; and 
(ii) a default under such an agreement. 
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor 
desires to make complies with the requirements of 
subsection (c) (6) of this section, if the consideration 
for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a 
consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the 
debtor. 
11 USC §524 (f) Nothing contained in subsection (c) or (d) of 
this section prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any 
debt. 
§78-2a-3 (2) (c), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953, 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988]. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(c) appeals from the circuit courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior to August, 1985, Respondents (Greggs) secured 
several loans from Appellant (Utah State Credit Union, 
hereinafter MUSCUM) . One of the loans was secured by a Fiat 
automobile and Honda Motorcycle. (Transcript p. 2) 
On August 9, 1985, the Greggs filed a petition in 
bankruptcy. Mrs. Gregg failed to attend the First Meeting of 
Creditors and, consequently, her petition was dismissed. Mr. 
Gregg was granted a discharge on November 22, 1985. (Transcript 
p. 30) 
During the intervening period between the filing of the 
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petitions for bankruptcy and Mr. Gregg's discharge, they both 
signed a new Note with USCU for $6,686.96. This Note was a 
rewrite of the loans the Greggs had outstanding prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petitions. The Note was signed by 
both Mr. and Mrs. Gregg. However, no Reaffirmation Agreement 
was ever executed or approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The 
Greggs1 purpose in signing the Note was to retain the collater-
al, the car and motorcycle, which they had previously pledged. 
The Greggs made payments on the Note until approximately March 
1987, after which they refused to make any additional payments. 
The collateral was subsequently repossessed and sold. 
(Transcript p. 31) 
After the sale of the vehicles, USCU instituted suit 
against the Greggs to recover the balance due after the sale of 
the collateral. (Transcript p. 2) 
Upon discovery by USCU that Mr. Gregg had been dis-
charged in bankruptcy from this particular debt he was dropped 
as a party to the action. A few days prior to the trial itself, 
Mrs. Gregg again filed bankruptcy and as of this moment any 
actions relating to Mrs. Gregg are stayed pending the outcome of 
that bankruptcy. (Transcript p. 3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Karen and William Gregg borrowed money from USCU. 
Finding they were unable to meet their commitments, Mr. Gregg 
filed bankruptcy. Desiring to retain their collateral, the 
Greggs signed a new note with USCU. Now, having wasted the 
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collateral and having had the benefit of its use for over a 
year and a half, the Greggs want their money back. 
Payments made by Karen Gregg, or with her funds, are 
clearly not refundable because the new note was a valid debt as 
to her. For that reason, the Greggs have attemped to create 
the fiction that although both Karen and William bring home 
approximately the same amount of income and pool their money in 
a joint bank account, the payments to USCU were from William 
Gregg's separate funds. 
Such a determination is contrary to both the facts and 
the law. The facts show that such a separation is irrational 
and inequitable. The law shows that once the funds are placed 
in a joint bank account they are the joint funds of the account 
owners, William and Karen Gregg. 
Even were such a separation possible, William Gregg 
would not be entitled to a refund, because the payments made 
would be voluntary payments to USCU to forestall repossession of 
the collateral or suit against his wife. Mr. Gregg had no 
obligation under the new note as he was discharged in bankrupt-
cy and no reaffirmation agreement was executed. Mrs. Gregg 
could at any time, as she did prior to the trial, file again for 
bankruptcy and likewise step out from liability. Where payments 
are made to security lien holders to retain collateral they are 
considered voluntary repayments. 
Finally, even if the lower court had been correct in 
determining the Greggs deserve a refund of money from USCU, the 
amount, as a matter of law and equity, should be reduced by the 
6 
amount of benefit received by the Greggs to prevent a windfall. 
In this instance, that amount should take into account the 
depreciation of the collateral while it was driven for a year 
and a half by the Greggs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
A REFUND OF ANY MONEY PAID BY APPELLANT. 
A. Karen Gregg Was Fully Obligated 
To Make Payments On The Loan. 
In William Gregg's schedule of income and expenditures 
filed with his bankruptcy petition (Exhibit ffAM) , he claimed 
average monthly income consisting of take-home pay for himself 
of $1,000.00 and for his wife, $700.00. The money earned from 
these activities was pooled in a joint bank account. Upon such 
pooling, both Greggs became joint owners of the funds so deposited. 
Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2dl7, 439 P.2d 468. 
(1968). Any money paid into such a joint account is therefore 
the joint property of both. Therefore, Mr. Gregg's claim that 
he paid the money from separate funds is totally inaccurate. 
It would be inequitable and totally impractical to require a 
lender to try and identify the actual source of joint funds 
once it has been commingled in the joint account. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 571 P2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1977). 
Because Karen Gregg's first bankruptcy petition was 
dismissed, she was fully obligated to make payments on the note 
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up until the time she filed her second petition a day or two 
before the trial. The Greggs conceived the fiction that her 
obligation could be avoided if they simply claimed that the 
money came from William's separate funds. This proposition 
simply cannot be supported. The money came from joint funds and 
both parties received the benefits of the continued use of the 
collateral. While they were using the collateral they had the 
responsibility to keep up the payments. To now rule that they 
are entitled to a refund would be totally inequitable and result 
in substantial injustice to USCU. 
B. All Payments Were Voluntary Payments 
Permitted By 11 USC §524 (f). 
USCU concedes that the Note signed by William Gregg was 
not a valid Reaffirmation Agreement as set forth in 11 USCA, 
Section 524. However, 11 USC, Section 524 (f) provides that 
nothing in the provisions relating to reaffirmations [Section 
524 (c) and (d)] prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any 
debt. While Section 524 (c) and Section 524 (d) preclude USCU 
from taking any affirmative action against William to enforce 
the new note, they do not preclude it from accepting voluntary 
payments from William or from proceeding normally to collect the 
account from Karen. 
Even if it could be shown that the money paid to USCU 
was from the separate funds of William Gregg, his choice to pay 
that money in order to continue to use the collateral and to 
preclude suit against his wife is a voluntary payment as set 
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forth in Section 524 (f). He would, therefore, not be entitled 
to demand his money back, especially after having enjoyed the 
benefit and use of the collateral for over a year and a half. 
In In Re Klapp, 80 B.R. 540 (Bkrtcy W.D. Okl. 1987), 
debtors held a mortgage which secured a debt previously dis-
charged in a Chapter 7 proceeding. In regard to that debt, the 
Court found: 
. . . no reaffirmation agreement of the debt under 11 
USC, Section 524 (c) was filed or otherwise entered 
into and a discharge was subsequently granted the 
debtors. 
Debtors nevertheless continued to make, and 
objecting creditors continued to accept, monthly debt 
service payments in accordance with the provisions of 
the Promissory Note. (In Re Klapp, page 541) 
The Court was then faced with determining what these 
payments constituted. The Court found: 
. . . the Court has previously noted that objecting 
creditors accepted payments in excess of $8,000.00 
between the date debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition 
and February, 1987, allocating such payments to 
principal and interest as though the debt was reaf-
firmed, even though no such reaffirmation was ever 
filed. Under 11 USC Section 524 (a) the discharge in 
debtor's Chapter 7 case operated as an injunction 
against the commencement or continuation of any 
action, the employment of process or any act to 
collect, recover or offset any debt discharged as a 
personal liability the debtor. With this in mind, 
objecting creditors must be assumed to have treated 
the post-discharge payments as voluntary payments by 
debtor, which is permitted by Section 524 (f). 
In Re Klapp at 544. 
In In Re Klapp, there was no obligation on the part of 
the creditors to return the money voluntarily paid by the 
debtors. 
To like affect was the finding of the Court in In Re 
Whitaker, 85B.R.788 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1988). In Whitaker the 
9 
debtors owned an automobile upon which the bank had a perfected 
security interest. Debtors continued to make payments on the 
automobile following their filing for bankruptcy. The debtors 
neither sought to redeem the automobile from the lien of the 
bank nor to negotiate a reaffirmation of terms with the bank. 
Debtors hoped that by continuing to make voluntary 
post-petition payments under the terms of the pre-petition 
secured obligation they would be entitled to retain possession 
of the car in accordance with the agreement. 
The Court found that the payments by the debtors were 
voluntary post-petition payments under Section 524 (f). It also 
found that debtors were not entitled to retain possession of the 
automobile after filing bankruptcy. The Court apparently 
allowed the creditors to retain the payments made by the debtor 
in spite of the fact that no valid reaffirmation agreement was 
executed between the parties. 
These cases are similar to the instant case in that they 
both reflect post-petition payments of debts secured with a 
valid security interest where no valid reaffirmation agreement 
was signed by the parties and submitted to the Court. In fact, 
the only difference between the instant case and Whitaker is 
that in the instant case debtors were allowed to retain the use 
of the collateral whereas in Whitaker the Bankruptcy Court 
approved the repossession of the property against the wishes of 
the debtors. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue influence or 
coercion on the part of USCU to force the Greggs to make the 
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payments after William's bankruptcy. The only undue influence 
even claimed by the Greggs is that "the creditor here was in a 
much-substantially stronger bargaining position in terms of 
applying some leverage and pressure." (Transcript, p. 36). 
Certainly there was some "leverage" held by USCU, i.e., make 
payments or turn over the collateral. This, however, is 
certainly not undue influence or coercion as USCU is simply 
asserting the rights given to it as a secured creditor under the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Therefore, the payments made were "voluntary payments" 
and USCU has every right to keep them under 11 USC §524 (f). 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT USED THE WRONG 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DAMAGES. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to determine 
that the payments made on the new Note to USCU were made from 
the separate funds of Mr. Gregg and further that those payments 
were made in violation of 11 USC, Section 524 (c), the standard 
for determining the damages used by the trial Court was 
inappropriate. 
The trial Court awarded Mr. Gregg the full amount of all 
payments made on the new Note. However, the correct standard 
in cases where the debtor has retained possession of collateral 
and continued to make payments based on an invalid 
reaffirmation agreement is set forth in In Re Kendrick, 75 B.R. 
451 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1987). 
In Kendrick the Court found that the creditor, the bank, 
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had used undue influence and coercion to require the debtor to 
execute a new Note which was a consolidation of all his 
pre-petition debts to the bank. As collateral for this new 
Note, the debtor pledged his car upon which the bank already had 
a valid security interest. In ordering the bank to return to 
the debtor all payments it had received in excess of the value 
of the automobile on the date the bankruptcy petition had been 
filed the Court reasoned: 
. the bank was entitled to surrender of the 
vehicle or payment of its value. Debtor has retained 
possession and the benefits of the vehicle and never 
returned or tendered return of the vehicle. It would 
be inequitable to permit debtor to retain the benefits 
of the continued possession and use of the vehicle. 
(Kendrick, page 456) 
When he filed his bankruptcy, Mr. Gregg completed 
schedule A-2 (Exhibit B) , designating those creditors holding 
security interests in certain properties. On this schedule, 
Mr. Gregg listed USCU as having a security interest in the Fiat 
automobile and the Honda motorcyle. The market value of these 
items on that date as shown on Gregg's schedules totaled 
$3,200.00. Upon sale of the secured property USCU received 
$1,125.00. As per the holding in Kendrick, USCU would then be 
entitled to receive additional amounts up to the sum of 
$2,075.00, which is in effect the depreciation in the value of 
the collateral from the date of bankruptcy filing up to the 
time of repossession. Therefore, the total judgment should not 
have exceeded $1,164.00 plus defendant's costs in the sum of 
$25.00, for a total judgment of $1,189.00. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS DECISION. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reqiiires that 
MIn all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the Court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon." 
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were made by 
the Court in this matter. "Failure to find upon all material 
issues raised by the pleadings is reversible error." LeGrand 
Johnson Corp. v Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 120 P.2d 615 (1966). 
Since no waiver of the findings and conclusions was 
made by the parties in this action, the decision must be 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Boyer Co v. 
Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court erred 
in awarding Judgment against the Plaintiff for the following 
reasons: 
(1) Karen Gregg was fully obligated to continue to make 
payments on the note and the proposition that the payments were 
made solely from William Gregg's separate funds cannot be 
supported by the law or facts of this case. 
(2) USCU had every right to continue to accept 
voluntary payments after William's discharge pursuant to 11 USC 
§524 (f). 
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(3) Even assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant was 
not entitled to accept the payments, USCU was entitled to be 
compensated for the depreciation of the vehicles from the date 
of the bankruptcy petition until the time they were 
repossessed. 
(4) The Court failed to make Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as required by law. 
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that the 
Judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed and that this Court 
award Appellant costs and such other relief as is appropriate. 
Respectfully Submitted this m—day of July, 1989. 
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SCHEDULE OF C E R E N T INCOME AND C U P ^ N T EXPENDITURES 
William Gregg and Karen Gregg L A H I I J I | A 
Name of Debtor. 
EXPENSES 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FUTURE MONTH.Y EXPENSES Of DEBTOR (NOT INCLUDING 
DEBTS TO BE PAID UNDER A PLAN UNDER CHAPTER 11 OR CHAPTER 13 Of THE 
• ANKKUPTCY CODE) CONSISTING Of 
RENT 0 * NOME LOAN PAYMENT 
JINCLUDE LOT RENTED FOR MOBILE HOME» * J 1 U . U U 
5 5 . 0 0 UTILITIES ELECTRICITY S 
WATER S 
MEAT S 
TELEPHONE S 
OTHER S 
75 
32 
.00 
00 
.00 
TOTAL UTi^rTlES 
CLOTHING 
LAUNDRY 1 CLEANING 
/ INCLUDING \ 
NEWSPAPERS PERIODICALS I BOOKS ^SCHOOL BOOKS/ 
DOCTOR 4 MEDICAL EXPENSES 
(NO* WClLfO'*G Al/'O »*rw*NTS TO IE »AlO 
TRANSPORTATION V«Ot* » » IAN U * 0 € « c « * * * t » i» 0« O * ' 
TE« U 0» TH£ »AX*»U»TC* COOii 
RECREATION CLUB I ENTERTAINMENT 
INSURANCE (NOT DEDUCTED FROM WAGES 
17.50 AUTO S . 
LIFE S . .00 
OTHER * M o t o r c y c l e 9 .00 
TAXES 
^ TOTAL INSTANCE 
NOT DEDUCTED FROM WAGES OR 
INCLUOED IN HOME LOAN PAYMENTS I 
IF YOU PAY OR ARE LIABLE FOR PAYMENT 
Of ALIMONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
STATE MONTHLY AMOUNT J 
THE NAME AGE 1 RELATIONSHIP TO YOU O* PERSONS FOR 
WHOSE BENEFIT PAYMENTS ARE MADE 
PAYMENTS FOR SUPPORT Of ADDfTlONAL 
DEPENDENTS NOT LIVING AT YOUR HOME 
OTHER (EXPLAIN) 
TOTAL ESTIMATED FUTURE MONTHLY EXPENSES 
162.00 
350.00 
50 .00 
25 .00 
15.00 
30 .00 
150.00 
75 .00 
26 .50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
t 1,193.50 
INCOME 
GIVE ESTIMATED AVERAGE FUTURE MONTHLY INCOME CONSISTS 
DEBTOR S TAXI HOME PAY (PER MONTH) 
SPOUSE S TAXE HOME PAY (PER MONTH) 
REGULAR INCOME AVAJLABLE FROM 
OPERATION OF BUSINESS OR PROFESSION 
DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ALIMONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS' 
IF SO STATE MONTHLY AMOUNT J . 
THE NAME AGE 1 RELATIONSHIP TO YOU Of PERSONS 
FOR WHOSE BENEFIT PAYMENTS ARE RECEIVED 
t 1 , 0 0 0 . 
700 . 
PENSION SOCIAL SECJ«rY 0 « RETIREMENT INCOME S . 
OTHER MONTHLY INCOME 
.0 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 1$ Y 7 0 0 0 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES t 1
 r 1 Q 3 . 50 
AMT Of PAYMENT TO 
THE TRUSTE (K ADDI.(_»D* 
une«f C**p i« ' 13 Pvin) I . n /a 
TOTAL Of EXPENSES AND 
PLAN PAYMENT |« Appl.CAWt) 
DIFFERENCE (* Apol.ca&i* 
Ucio«f C»*pttf 13 Pun) S . 
DEPENDENTS 
NUMBER AGE I Rl LAnONSHlP Of DEPENDENTS (EXCEPT CURRENT S* 
Asnley Marie Gregg age 7, daugnter 
Miscy Lee Gregg, age 4, daugncer. 
C O M P E X U m O N PAJD OR PWQMHED TO ATTO^XET FOR DEBTOR 
HAVE YOU PAIO OR AGREED TO PAY (O-a TRANSFIRED OR AGREED TO TRANSFER ANY PRO^RTT) TO YOUR ATTORNEY FOR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WTT 
CASE OTHER THAN AGREEING TO PAY SJCH COMPENSATION AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE COURT TO BE PA.O BY THE TRUSTEE FROM MONIES PAJO TO TXE T 
FOR YOU* ACCOUNT? YES D NO Q ^ 
IF THE ANSWER IS YES STATE THE NATJ«*E AND THE AMOUNT Of COMPENSATION PAJD OR PROMISED AND THE SOURCE Of TM£ PAYMENT 
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Schedule A-2 — Creditors holding security 
N l M U o ( l I( ( l l l o l l i u l U S I l l c i K C Ol p i UC 
of business (il u n k n o w n so state), in 
elude zip code 
D c s u i p n o n o( s u u m y and d itc when 
obtained by cicdnor 
Speeif) when el u m was incurred and 
the consideration therefor, when 
( h m i is t o m m g e m , unlu ju id ited 
disputed subject to seiuli evidenced 
by a j u d g m e n t , negotiable instru 
m e n t , or other wr i t ing , or incurred as 
paitner or joint contr ietor, so in 
die ne specify name of my partner or 
joint contractor on my debt 
M u t k t l value 
Amount of claim 
without deduc 
tion of value 
of security 
UCcih S t a t e E m p l o y e e ' s C r e d i t Unio 
660 South 2nd Last 
S t l t Kike C i t y , Utah 84145-0001 
Utah S t a t e L m p l o y e e ' s C i e d i t Unio 
660 Sou th 2nd I n n l 
S a l t l a k e C i t y , Utah 84145-0001 
A u t o m o b i l e , 1978 l i a L R a l l y 
1984 Honda Magna M o t o r c y c l e 
I n c l i n e d ApL J1 1983 , p u r c h a s e | $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
of a u t o m o b i l e 
I n c l i n e d h i ly 1984, p u r c h a s e 2,200.00 
$ 8 7 3 . 0 0 
2 , 7 3 4 . 1 6 
S 
ex? 
Total J 3 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 j 3 , 6 0 7 . 1 6 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: With regards now to the Credit Union 
vs. Gregg matter. Do you wish to make an opening statement? 
MR. KENT: We could probably help the Court out a 
little bit on this. The—let me explain where we're at on 
this. 
Mr. Gregg had filed bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy in 1985. After that time—I guess at the same 
time, his wife also filed bankruptcy. The wife apparently 
didn't show up at the first meeting of creditors, her 
bankruptcy was dismissed, and the—and a bankruptcy discharge 
was entered on behalf of Mr. Gregg in this case. That was 
in November of 1985, I believe, that discharge was granted. 
Just a week or so before that, the time the 
discharge was granted, they had these folks in, -the credit 
union did, and they re-signed some papers. What it was was 
a consolidation of three previous loans that Mr. Gregg had 
had. There was a signature loan, actually tv/o signature 
loans, a loan for a motorcycle, and a loan for a car. Both 
Mrs. Gregg and Mr. Gregg signed those documents. 
There was not any reaffirmation agreement approved 
by the United States Bankruptcy Court, and this was being a 
reaffirmation of a debt owed by Mr. Gregg. I filed suit 
after being advised by my client that the loan had gone 
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delinquent• I was immediately notified by a pro se answer 
from the defendant that he filed bankruptcy and the debt 
had been discharged and that he had never signed any 
reaffirmation. Shortly after that, I was also contacted by 
Mr. Gillman on behalf of the defendants. 
I subsequently filed my own motion to dismiss the 
matter as against Ilr. Gregg, being fully aware of the fact 
that without our signed reaffirmation, court-approved 
reaffirmation, we had no right to proceed against him to 
collect on a debt that was discharged in the bankruptcy. 
That still left Mrs, Gregg as a defendant in the 
action. Mr. Gregg, Mr. Gillman on his behalf, filed a 
counterclaim against the credit union, claiming that the 
monies v/hich had been paid pursuant to the reaffirmation on 
his part and simply a renegotiation of a loan with Mrs. Gregg| 
he claimed that he was entitled to have that money back, 
indicating and claiming in his counterclaim that those 
monies were paid because he was under the assumption that he 
had a legal and binding reaffirmation agreement, so he paid 
those monies. 
He's now asked for some $4,70C back, claims that he 
ought to have that back. Said that all the payments that 
were made v/ere made by him personally and that his wife 
didn't make any of those payments, so he wants his money 
back, Mrs. Gregg filed bankruptcy last week, so we're not 
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on August 9 of 1985, the Greggs filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. At the 341 meeting of creditors, Mrs. Gregg, for 
reasons that are probably not relevant to this proceeding, 
failed to appear and the natter was bifurcated, bifurcated 
by the bankruptcy court and the natter dismissed as to her. 
I think there's no dispute that following that 
time, I think that the note that is now in evidence will 
reflect that the defendants signed the note at different 
times, I think one was October 10 and one signed on October 
19, but in anyevent, the new note was signed. 
MR. KENT: Lxcuse me. Can I interrupt for just 
one second? Just to make something clear, I'm sorry to 
interrupt. Me9re not dismissing the case against firs. Gregg 
at this time, it's just stayed. We donft know what's going 
to happen with her bankruptcy. Ue have dismissed against 
tor. Gregg. 
MR. GILL13\:i: And that's correct. 
THE COURT: I look at that—is it the 17th or the 
19th? It's a JLitcle hard to see there on that, the date 
that Mrs. Gregg signed that note. 
KR. GILLMAN: I thought it was the 19th. The 
Court may be correct, I'm not s u r e — 
THh COURT: It's looks like it was 11 and then she 
made a seven out of it, but she may have tried to be a 19, 
I just was wondering. 
-30-
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MR. GILLMA1J; I'm not sure that it makes a great 
deal of— 
THL COURT; It doesn't make a lot of difference. 
Go ahead. 
MR. GILLKA1I: —of difference, really. Certainly, 
the signatures occurred prior to the date of the entry of 
the discharge, which I believe was November 22nd of 1985. 
The new note, as I think has been stipulated, was 
a consolidation of all the pre-petition dischargeable debts 
and was signed in order to allow fir. Gregg to keep possessiorj 
of the motor vehicles which he was trying to use in 
connection with his job. The new note was the total sum of 
$6,686.96, as appears on the exhibit. 
From about 30 days after that, the Fiat was 
inoperable. The time of year it was, I suppose the 
motorcycle was not usable, it was very cold, and it was put 
into storage. 
Mrs. Gregg herself made no payments on that 
obligation. She maintains self-employment in the home as a 
child care provider. hhe isn't even a licensed driver. She 
had no need for the vehicles. 
The Greggs were called into the credit union, this 
note was presented to them, they were never properly 
advised of their rights. The simple fact of the matter is, 
as a reaffirmation agreement, it is invalid, and the 
31. 
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bearing, maybe they weren't in this case, but certainly as in 
most cases, the creditor here was in a much—substantially 
stronger bargaining position in terms of applying some 
leverage and pressure, youfve got a debtor out there, a 
couple of vehicles, he'd like to have them, you've got to 
reaffirm there's—in order to keep these vehicles. There 
was no relation, as far as we can see, to the amount of the 
new note the actual value of the vehicles. The new note 
was for in excess of $6,000. 
Once the vehicles were repossessed a fairly short 
time later, one was worth nothing and the other one was worthl 
$1,150. 1 think there's clear over-reaching on the part of 
the credit union in this situation and to allow them to keep 
this sum of money simply because 2*rs. Gregg had signed this 
note also and they could have tried to collect from her, 
would, because of the practical effect of the thing, be a 
complete violation of congressional policy and intent of 
this statute, and we think under the laws we've cited to the 
Court that this defendant is entitled to refund of that sum. 
And again, the 1,150 should be theirs, because 
we don't dispute the validity of the security agreement. 
THi- COURT; Thank you. 
>:r. Kent? 
IJR. KANT: The statute that Mr. Cillran has not 
referred the Court to is contained in 11 U.L3.C.S. Section 
JJL 
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